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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA 
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants, 
vs. 
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE 
DOES I - X, whose true names are unknown, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Supreme Court No. 34250 
Case No. CV 03-9214 
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APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the 
First Judicial District for Kootenai County 
The Honorable Charles W. Hosack, District Judge, Presiding 
Douglas S. Marfice 
April M. Linscott 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
618 N. 4th Street 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Patrick E. Miller, Esq. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 
P.O. BoxE 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-0328 
Attorney for Respondents 
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ARGUMENT 
The issue presented on appeal is whether the District Court erred in its broad 
detennination that Farmers is not obligated to compensate the Anustrongs under contract or 
any other theory of law. The Arrnstrongs argue that the District Court impermissibly granted 
sununary judgment to non-moving party Farmers on issues that were not raised or addressed 
by moving party Annstrongs and that the District Court incorrectly interpreted the 
Armstrongs' insurance policy as a matter oflaw. 
I. The District Court, in error, granted summary judgment to the non-
moving party (Farmers) on an issue that was not raised or addressed by 
the moving party (Armstrongs). 
The Annstrongs moved the District Court for partial summary judgment in the fom1 
ofa declaration interpreting a provision of their homeowner's insurance policy and enforcing 
their right to coverage. R. p. 79. The sole contract provision that the Armstrongs sought 
interpretation of was the provision providing coverage for loss caused by sudden, accidental 
discharge of water from a household appliance. R. p. 82. The Farmer's Policy includes a 
blanketexclusjon for water. However, within the water damage exclusion sonie coverage is 
given back (i.e. - loss caused by water which has escaped from an appliance). 
Farmers never made a cross motion for sunu11ary judgment. However, it did respond 
to the Annstrongs' motion. In Fanners' response, it acknowledged that the only issue before 
the Court was whether an ambiguity under the policy exists. R. p. 91. Further, Farmers' 
briefing only addressed the ambiguity related to the policy provision providing coverage for 
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water from within a household appliance. R. p. JOI. Farmers' summary judgment briefing 
also pointed to disputes of facts unrelated to the appliance provision. 
The Annstrongs' Reply briefing focused the District Court on the nanow issue of the 
appliance provision. R. p. 145. The Annstrongs informed the District Court that for purposes 
of their motion for summary judgment, the Annstrongs were not raising issues of coverage 
unrelated to the appliance provision of the Policy. R. p. 145. The Annstrongs aclmowledged 
that issues of fact existed on other theories of recovery. Id. That is precisely why the 
Armstrongs narrowed their summary judgment argument. The District Court then broadly 
ruled that under the facts of this case, Farmers was not obligated to compensate the 
Am1strongs for their losses under any theory. R. p. 180. 
The Armstrongs are not appealing the District Court's denial of their Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. They are appealing the District Court's ruling granting 
summary judgment to non-moving party Farmers. The District Court, in a procedural game 
of hopscotch, granted summary judgment to non-moving Farmers by having Farmers file a 
motion for summary judgment after the ruling was already made. See, Tr. p. 3, ll. 16 -25; p. 
4, ll. 1-6 (2007). 
The District Court recognized that it could have granted summary judgment against 
the Armstrongs sua sponte when ruling on the Annstrongs' motion for summary judgment. 
However the Court did not "take that extra step" since no cross-motion for summary 
judgment had been made. See, Tr. p. 4, ll. 19-25 (2007). The District Court acknowledge 
that granting Farmer's Motion for Summary Judgment was the same as if it had granted the 
2 
non-moving party summary judgment at the time the Armstrongs' filed their motion for 
Summary Judgment. See, Tr. p. 6, ll. 5-19; p. 7, ll. 1-7 (2007). All parties agreed that this 
was the proceeding that was taking place. 
In granting Fa1mers' Motion for Summary Judgment the District Court was trying to 
avoid "hassles" on appeal from a procedural basis. See, Tr. p. 3 ll. 16-22 (2007). The intent 
of parties' procedural actions was to avoid the appellate court from saying there's some 
question about the appealability of this case. Tr. p. 6, ll. 1-5 (2007). 
The issue that the District Court and the parties was trying to avoid is the same 
procedural issue that Farmers is now raising. Farmers' argues that the Armstrongs should 
not be allowed to appeal the denial of their motion for summary judgment while at the same 
time raising issues for the first time on appeal. The Armstrongs are not raising issues for the 
first time on appeal, nor are they appealing a denial of their motion for summary judgment. 
The Armstrongs are raising issues that were never considered by the court when it granted 
summary judgment to Farmers. Summary judgment cam10t be based on issues raised sua 
sponte by the District Court without affording parties adequate advance notice and 
opportunity to respond to issues raised by the court. Mason v. Tucker and Assoc., 125 Idaho 
429, 432, 871 P.2d 846, 849 (Ct. App. 1994). In instances where summary judgment is 
granted to the non-moving party, the record should be liberally construed in favor of the 
party against whom summary judgment was entered. Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 
677-678, 39 P.3d 612, 617-618 (2001). 
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As a result of the Annstrongs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment the District 
Court made a blanket detennination that the no coverage existed for the Annstrongs' claims. 
R. p. 180. This had the same effect as granting SUlrunary judgment to Farmers. In fact this 
was the same bases that Farmers raised for moving for summary judgment in its motion. R. 
pp. 190-191. The District Court had already ruled that Farmers was not obligated under any 
theory of law to compensate the Armstrongs. Based on this ruling the Annstrongs did not 
have a basis to oppose Farmers' Motion for Summary Judgment. A district court must not be 
allowed to decide a issue that a party did not have advance notice of and opportunity to 
demonstrate why summary judgment should not be entered. Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 
at 678, 39 P.3d at 618. 
As the non-moving party, the Arrnstrongs had no occasion to raise issues of fact 
regarding their other claims for coverage. In their complaint the Annstrong's alleged causes 
of action for breach of contract of insurance, breach of covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, negligent investigation and claim adjustment, unfair trade practice in violation of 
I.C. § 41-1329 and 41-1831, and constructive fraud relating to the issue of whether there was 
insurance coverage. Each of these claims on any theory of Jaw were wiped out by the 
District Court's premature ruling that no coverage existed. 
The sole issue presented in Am1strongs' Motion for Partial Smmnary Judgment was 
the interpretation of the appliance provision. This created no need for the Armstrongs to 
present evidence on their other theories of recovery. Nor did Farmer's motion alert them to 
submit legal authorities and argument regarding other theories of recovery. The Armstrongs 
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had no notice that their entire case about to be dismissed. Therefore, they had no opportunity 
to demonstrate that it should not be dismissed. Once the Armstrongs had notice ofFa1mers' 
motion for summary judgment, the District Court had already made its ruling. This case 
must be sent back on remand. 
II. The District Court's decision should be vacated and the case remanded 
for further proceedings on the issue of whether Farmers is obligated by 
contract or oral binder to compensate the Armstrongs for their loss to 
dwelling and personal property. 
In its detennination that no coverage existed for the Armstrongs' claimed losses, the 
court did not consider coverage arguments other than the narrow one present to it in the 
Armstrongs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Theories of recovery based on 
provisions in the policy other than the appliance provision and other equitable and public 
policy theories were not considered by the District Court. The Armstrongs must be allowed 
to present other theories of their case that were not presented at summary judgment. The 
Annstrongs purposely avoided those theories because they recognized that material issues of 
fact existed and a trial would need to be heard by a fact finder. The Annstrongs incorporate 
by reference their previous aTguments on appeal and on summary judgment below. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court's Orders should be vacated and the case remanded for further 
proceedings. The District Court erred in its ruling that Farmers is not obligated to 
compensate the Armstrongs under any contract theory or any other theory of!aw. 
II 
II 
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Respectfully submitted this 13th day of March, 2008. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 13th day of March 2008, I served two (2) true and 
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Patrick E. Miller, Esq. -Xus Mail 
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